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 The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East. By BEN-
 JAMIN ISAAC. Revised edition. Oxford: CLARENDON PRESS,
 1992. Pp. xiv + 510; 5 maps. $98 (cloth), $29.95 (paper);
 CDN $53.95 (paper).
 This is that rare book combining critical discussion of detail
 with a broad historical vision. Isaac's command of classical,
 Talmudic, and archaeological evidence is impressive and pro-
 vides a solid base upon which he builds a carefully crafted ar-
 gument. The Limits of Empire is well worth reading for its
 in-depth description of both the peace- and war-time activities
 of the Roman army in the East, but it is best understood as part
 of a sharp debate in Roman historiography over the question of
 "grand strategy" in Roman imperial military planning.
 In many respects, this book is a rejoinder to a work by the
 military theorist Edward Luttwak,l which attempted to set out
 strategic concepts behind Roman military dispositions. Lutt-
 wak's ideas, and particularly the notion that the Romans pos-
 sessed a sophisticated notion of strategic planning, have been
 very influential among Roman historians.
 Isaac argues forcefully that Luttwak's view of a defensive
 Roman Empire, guarding its borders against constant barbarian
 threat, is a modern one and anachronistic. The Roman frontier
 was a much more amorphous concept than the rigid boundary
 suggested by Hadrian's Wall and the defensive systems in Ger-
 many and Africa, and Isaac points out that the Romans did not
 necessarily see a line of fortresses as a national boundary in the
 modern sense. Such structures may not have been primarily
 intended as defensive installations but might well have been
 placed for other purposes, such as controlling traffic and raising
 customs revenues.
 Isaac perhaps takes this argument too far. As E. L. Wheeler
 has pointed out in a lengthy review (and vigorous defense) of
 Luttwak,2 a fort can serve both external and internal security.
 Nevertheless, Isaac's emphasis on the police and administrative
 functions of the army are an important counter-weight to his-
 torical theories that see the military strictly in its war-making
 capacity.
 The book's most dramatic argument is that the Romans had
 no "grand strategy" in the modern sense at all. Isaac notes
 that the Romans lacked any sort of military staff, intelligence
 service, and, most importantly, the map-making ability upon
 which all modern military and political planning is based.
 While there are ancient maps, such as the Peutinger Table and
 1 Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman
 Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976).
 2 Everett L. Wheeler, "Methodological Limits and the Mirage
 of Roman Strategy," The Journal of Military History 57 (1993):
 7-41 (esp. p. 37), 215-40.
 the Madaba Map, they lack scale, the most important element
 of modern cartography.
 In any case, Isaac says, the Romans never had a defensive
 strategy and always saw their army as a potentially offensive
 force. Wars were conducted for a variety of reasons, including
 the personal glory of the emperor, which had no "strategic"
 element whatsoever.
 To some extent, Isaac underestimates the sophistication of Ro-
 man military organization. The emperors did keep close track of
 military strength, and one should not reject the possibility of
 military intelligence or strategic thinking because no direct at-
 testation of it has survived. Nevertheless, again, Isaac's book
 provides balance to Luttwak's schematizations, and his point
 about the personal element in imperial policy is important.
 The book takes the long view, covering the period from the
 first direct Roman control in the East in the first centuiy B.C.
 well into the Byzantine period in the seventh century A.D.
 While this approach does have its advantages, one problem is
 that the development of institutions is not always clear. This
 is especially the case in the sections covering taxation, requi-
 sition, and impressment (angaria) by the army.
 Isaac's discussions of geography are detailed and are an im-
 portant part of his argument. While the book's maps are fairly
 good, they are placed at the back of the book, resulting in much
 flipping back and forth. In many sections, where there are de-
 ailed geographic discussions, small, more detailed maps, keyed
 to the text, would have been most useful.
 One of the strengths of Isaac's book is the way in which
 Talmudic material is integrated into the text and put into the
 context of Roman legal and military institutions. It is disap-
 pointing, therefore, that while Latin and Greek versions of clas-
 sical texts are given, no Aramaic transcriptions are given.
 Oxford University Press certainly has the technical capability
 to do so, and a book which merited a second edition certainly
 deserved this modest additional investment.
 Isaac covers an enormous amount of material with remark-
 able erudition. A brief review cannot do it justice. His chapter
 on veteran colonies (ch. 7), for example, is an important con-
 tribution to the field and deserves more discussion. Suffice it to
 say that The Limits of Empire is a classic study of frontiers and
 frontier policy in antiquity and as such belongs on the book-
 shelf of all ancient historians, whether their field is Rome or
 not. It is of value to those studying other Near Eastern empires:
 Isaac's geopolitical and military points are often applicable to
 earlier, and later, periods.
 JONATHAN ROTH
 SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY
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